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THE FOCAL ISSUE: DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATION OR
ADVERSE IMPACT?
Title VII forbids any employment policy decision made on the
basis of certain proscribed criteria which the Congress implicitly re-
gards as invidious:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
Thus, by the plain language of the Act, any employment decision
motivated by racial considerations is forbidden. However, very early
in the operation of Title VII, the question arose whether only inten-
tionally discriminatory employment practices were forbidden, or
whether standards which are racially neutral in their formulation,
but which, in fact, result in discrimination against a racial group,
were unlawful employment practices as well. Before the operation of
Title VII, private employers had an unlimited number of prerogatives
in formulating criteria for hiring, promoting and firing their employ-
ees. Title VII limited these prerogatives by forbidding employers to
be influenced in such decisions by a person's race.' However, it was
unclear whether this was the full extent of the scope of the Act, so
that in order to bring the remedial provisions of the Title into effect,
an aggrieved employee would have to prove that the employer was
motivated to make a particular decision, at least in part, by racial
considerations. The chief alternative was to consider invalid any
standard which discriminated against minorities in its operation. The
resolution of this question would determine in large measure the
effectiveness of the Act, because if only intentionally discriminatory
employment practices were construed as within the scope of prohibi-
1. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970).
2. Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Developmentsl.
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tion, much de facto discrimination would go untouched, and only the
most obviously arbitrary activity would be reached.
Those charged with administration or interpretation of the Act
were faced with the choice of diluting its application by requiring a
showing of discriminatory intent or of sharply reducing employer
prerogatives in hiring practices. If the latter course was taken, the
question became where to draw the line in forbidding practices whose
results were discriminatory whether intentional or not. Certainly,
even the strongest supporters of a broad interpretation of the Act
acknowledged that an employer could not be required to hire a minor-
ity applicant merely because he was a member of a protected group.
The Act clearly forbade such preferential treatment. But, for exam-
ple, if the employer had a policy of hiring only graduates of a local
high school, and it so happened that only whites attended that
school, was this included in the provisions of the Act as a "refus(al)
to hire" an individual "because of such individual's race"?3 On the
other hand, would the employer's legitimate interest in promoting
public relations with the local populace overcome the adverse impact
his policy had on members of the minority group?
To complicate the problem, the Act approved with certain quali-
fications two of the most widely used criteria for employment deci-
sions: tests and seniority systems.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply differ-
ent standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the re-
sult of an intention to discriminate because of race . . . , nor
shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race .... 4
Thus, administrative and judicial decisions considering the use of
facially neutral standards that resulted in discrimination centered
around testing and seniority promotion cases, each progressing
through its separate but related development until finally converging
before the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. '
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
4. Id. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1970). (Emphasis added.)
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Testing as a Criterion in Making Employment Decisions
The EEOC Guidelines
The agency charged with administration of Title VII is the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The Commission issued
guidelines on testing in 1967 which were revised into more compre-
hensive provisions in 1970. These administrative directives framed
the basic issues to be later litigated in the courts and served to initi-
ate momentum toward an expansive interpretation of the Act.
A principal concern of experts considering employment testing
involved strong evidence that many tests used as employee screening
devices did not, in practice, accurately predict relative job perform-
ance." This problem was further compounded in the Commission's
view by the fact that such tests invariably disqualify a greater percen-
tage of blacks than whites from consideration for employment posi-
tions, and may be unpredictive as to entire cultural and racial
groups.7 The guidelines, consequently, require that standards used by
employers to make hiring and other employment decisions be "job
related." Tests with a detrimental effect upon minority groups were
declared presumptively illegal, without any showing of discrimina-
tory intent, unless proven to be related to job performance by use of
a scientific procedure known as "validation."" Furthermore, the
Commission advocated the use of empirical validation,9 the most
6. The majority of employers using tests to screen applicants are doing so without
empirical evidence that the test measures the abilities sought, and many studies have
indicated that scores on even the most widely used tests bear little or no relationship
to job performance. See Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability
Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 696-98 (1968)
1hereinafter cited as Legal Implications]; Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1637-38, 1647 (1969) [hereinafter cited Cooper &
Sobolj; Developments at 1121.
7. This fact is generally explained by the fact that blacks have been deprived of
educational, social and cultural opportunities relevant to the content and skills in
taking many employment tests but often irrelevant to performance of the particular
employment task involved. All ability examinations, whether intelligence, aptitude,
or achievement tests, measure what the individual has learned; the crucial factors in
a person's score are the quality and extent of his past schooling and training and the
degree of correlation between his cultural milieu and that which serves as the test's
point of reference. See Legal Implications at 704; Cooper & Sobol at 1639; Westman,
Intelligent Testing, 23 AM. PsYcH. 267 (1968).
8. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,334 (1970).
9. Developments at 1116. Empirical validation involves giving a random sample
group of job applicants of a significant number a test whose contents experts believe
are of such a nature that test performance should bear a direct relationship to job
performance. The next step is to employ the entire sample group, and, using objective
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stringent variety of such procedures, as well as the generation of
separate data for minority and non-minority groups, ("differential
validation"), in order to compensate for the bias against blacks inher-
ent in many tests.'0
A related problem attacked by the Commission as discrimina-
tory under the Act was "promotability" or "trainability" testing, a
device used by employers to test job applicants as to their ability to
hold higher positions than they are seeking in the company. Such
procedures often have a disproportionately adverse effect upon mi-
norities," and the guidelines sanction their use only if the worker's
progress to the higher job for which he is tested is of "high probabil-
ity" or "nearly automatic."' 2
Court Decisions Before Griggs
As the courts began considering complaints under Title VII, the
first determination with which they were faced was the appropriate
standard for establishing that an employer was discriminating on the
basis of race in contravention of the Act. The pre-Griggs cases fall
into basically two categories: (1) those rejecting the guidelines by
criteria such as productivity, volume of sales and the like, attempt to correlate high
test scores with superior job performance. If there is a direct relationship between the
two, the test is then termed "validated." If not, the test is not a true predictor of job
performance; rather it is only proof that those scoring well had an affinity toward the
particular subject matter of which the test is composed. "Content validation" and
"concurrent validation" are two other procedures, less accurate but considerably less
demanding upon an employer's resources. See Legal Implications at 696-99;
Developments at 1128; Cooper & Sobol at 1643.
10. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,335 (1970). Differential validity determines (a) whether the
test has validity in predicting job performance for both races and (b) whether a lower
score by a black applicant is equally predictive of his future job success as a higher
score is by a white. If both of these determinations are answered in the affirmative,
the employer must upgrade the sources of blacks as a cultural group to equalize the
predictive capability of the test. See H. Wilson, Griggs and Job Testing, 58 VA. L. REV.
844 (1972); Lopez, Current Problems in Test Performance of Job Applicants, Sympos-
ium, The Industrial Psychologist: Selection and Equal Employment Opportunity, 19
PERS. PSYCH. 1, 10-19 (1966); Legal Implications at 705.
11. It has been pointed out that it is unnecessary and even wasteful to require in
every candidate for employment a potential for promotion to higher positions within
the corporate hierarchy. In one particular case reaching the courts, an employer re-
quired even janitorial applicants to successfully complete a test which was proven to
be valid in predicting job success for only the top eight percent of the jobs in the plant.
Moreover, employees may improve their capabilities during the years before they are
eligible for promotion, especially in cases where they are members of minority groups
whose capabilities have been artificially supressed by discrimination. See Cooper &
Sobol at 1648-49.
12. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,335 (1970).
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requiring a showing that the test was administered or graded with the
intent to discriminate and thus was not related to any'"genuine busi-
ness purpose";13 and (2) those following the guidelines by requiring
that tests with a statistically significant adverse differential impact
upon minorities be job related."
Those courts adopting the "business purpose" standard erected
a difficult barrier for aggrieved employment applicants to overcome.
There was no requirement that the test be related to job performance
and, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, an almost impossible
burden of proof in most cases, the plaintiff was required to demon-
strate that the test served no conceivable business purpose."
Even those courts which accepted the requirement of job related-
ness as the standard in determining the propriety of a discriminatory
test varied substantially in the requisite criteria demanded from
employers seeking to demonstrate that their tests were job related.
The only unequivocal endorsement of the EEOC's requirement of
empirical validation came in the Fifth Circuit decision, Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach, Inc.'" The court affirmed the district court which
declared that validation of a test which is prima facie discriminatory
demands great professional expertise, and the empirical validation
methods prescribed in the guidelines should be given "great defer-
ence."'" On the other hand, in United States v. H.K. Porter,'8 a dis-
trict court held that empirical validation is not necessary in all cir-
cumstances to prove job relatedness. No data was presented, but
rather, a personnel manager who had "majored in psychology in col-
lege" studied the job performance of employees who had been given
an employment test, and thereby determined that the test was a valid
predictor of employment performance.' 9 To the same effect was
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212,(3 where a test was upheld
on the grounds that it was, in the opinion of the court "reasonably
related to the proper attitudes" and "properly selected" by an expert
consultant. Again, there was a total absence of any empirical evi-
dence, and even the attempted content validity procedures were of
no value by scientific standards.
13. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Pow. Co., 420 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1969).
14. See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 1970);
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1969).
16. 310 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. La. 1970).
17. Id. at 538.
18. 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
19. Id. at 76. "Such a loose definition of validation dilutes considerably the court's
approval of job relatedness." See Developments 1133.
20. Dobbins v. Local 212, Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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Considering the low threshold of proof required to exonerate
employers of charges of discrimination in their testing procedures and
in determining whether a test is discriminatory or not, it is no sur-
prise that the other, even more demanding requirements of the guide-
lines received little support from the judiciary. Most judges did not
even consider the necessity of differential validation, and that con-
cept was specifically rejected in H.K. Porter as constituting "prohib-
ited discrimination" in favor of blacks.2' Even those cases ostensibly
accepting the job related standard for testing allowed employers to
test applicants for promotability without restriction."
Use of Seniority Systems in Transfer and Promotion
Seniority systems are of many types and are used as criteria for
management decision-making of all kinds. However, the type of sen-
iority system involved here determines relations of employees to one
another, or their "comparative status."23 As such, a seniority system
involves a set of rules governing job movements, including promo-
tions, transfers, downgrading and lay-offs. The most "senior" man
among a group of competing workers within a particular "seniority
unit" is preferred, provided that he is qualified and eligible to fill the
job in question. Seniority may be measured by length of service in
an entire plant, in a department, in a "line of progression," or even
in a particular job. However, regardless of how seniority is measured,
its effect largely depends upon the range of jobs for which an em-
ployee is allowed to compete when openings occur and from which he
can "bump" a less senior man if he is displaced from his position.24
As with other employment procedures, discrimination was com-
mon in the structure and administration of seniority systems before
the effective date of Title VII. Seniority systems are so varied and
complex that an examination of all their forms would be virtually
impossible, and the various structures formerly used to effectively
segregate and disadvantage black employees within such systems is
equally unapproachable. However, three types of explicit discrimina-
tion were most common: 5 (1) separate white and black seniority lists
for the same work, structured in such a way that the highest position
in the black seniority unit was below the lowest position in the white
unit; (2) artificial division into two or more seniority units of a group
21. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
22. Developments at 1138.
23. Id. at 1156.
24. Note, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Seniority].
25. Developments at 1158.
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of jobs having so much functional interrelation in terms of skills
required for performance that the jobs would normally have consti-
tuted a single unit for seniority purposes; both blacks and whites were
hired to fill the lowest or entry positions, but only whites were allowed
to transfer to the other unit where the more lucrative jobs of a similar
functional nature were located; (3) two or more groups of related jobs
organized into separate segregated seniority districts, with blacks
holding the "Negro" jobs, invariably the lowest paid and least desira-
ble, and whites holding the more preferable "white" jobs.
That part of Title VII forbidding segregation or classification of
employees on the basis of race in any way when such separation
results in an adverse impact upon any employees26 clearly made any
overt discriminatory seniority system illegal. Thus, within the years
immediately subsequent to the passage of the Act, employers elimi-
nated virtually all segregated lines of progression, the barriers to
transfer by blacks to formerly all-white seniority units, and exclusive
racial hiring for particular classes of jobs.27 However, the systems
which employers substituted in place of the overt discrimination
often constituted a structure serving to "freeze" blacks into positions
they held under the prior systems. 2 The past operation of a discrimi-
natory seniority system had established a particular distribution of
jobs among the employees and a fixed competitive standing among
them with respect to future job movements, 2' and the contention was
that the failure to take some sort of remedial action beyond merely a
cessation of policies overtly hostile to newly hired black employees,
constituted present discrimination proscribed by the Title.
Perhaps the best approach to take in order to elucidate this
rather complex problem is to examine a typical illustration of the
consequences of merging seniority lines. The particular fact situation
described below was presented to the Fifth Circuit in Local 189,
United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,"' a case
involving Crown Zellerbach's plant at Bogalusa, Louisiana.
The company, until May, 1964, organized jobs hierarchically
within "lines of progression" by race, resulting in the white union
having jurisdiction of the more desirable lines and the black union
charged with responsibility over the "left-overs," so that the lowest
white jobs were more highly paid than the highest black positions.
Promotion within the lines was determined by "job seniority": when
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970).
27. Developments at 1158.
28. Id.
29. Seniority at 1268.
30. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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a vacancy occurred, workers in the job slot immediately below it
could bid for the opening, and the one who had worked longest in that
slot was given priority.3'
The company put new employees on "extra boards," which were
labor pools used to fill temporary vacancies within the lines of pro-
gression. The senior workers on the extra boards had first call on
vacancies in the entry jobs at the bottom of the various lines. When
lay-offs occurred, those at the bottom of the line were "bumped back"
to the extra board, but under "rights of recall," they had first claim
on vacancies in any entry level job they may have held.3" The extra
boards, like the lines of progression, were segregated by the employer.
After the effective date of Title VII, Crown Zellerbach merged all
black and white lines of progression within each department and this
merger was effected on the basis of existing pay rates." With the
exception of one job in the entire plant, this merger by pay rates
resulted in the tacking on of black lines of progression at the bottom
of white lines, since black jobs were invariably the lowest paying.
This plan had many practical consequences which resulted in advan-
tages to white employees. First of all, whites on the extra boards who
had rights of recall to jobs which were formerly entry jobs into the
whites' lines of progression, retained those rights to the same jobs,
even though the position was no longer at the entry level, but in the
middle of the merged lines of progression. More crucially, Crown
Zellerbach continued to award promotions according to job seniority,
that is, that the man with the most years in the job slot immediately
below the vacancy had first call. Thus, total time worked in the mill
meant nothing as such. As a result, blacks had no seniority in bidding
for formerly white jobs except as against each other at entry positions
to the formerly all white jobs. Thus, the system conditioned job ad-
vancement upon a qualification that the company itself had limited
racially, regardless of whether that qualification-seniority in pre-
viously white jobs-was necessary to do the work. 4
Despite the absence of administrative guidelines such as those
issued for testing, the courts were surprisingly uniform in their con-
demnation of seniority systems which served to freeze in discrimina-
tion practiced before the effective date of the Act, and in their devel-
opment of a legal standard to be applied to seniority promotion cases
under Title VII. The leading case which declared that present policies
perpetuating pre-Act discrimination constitute forbidden present
31. Id. at 983.
32. Id.




discrimination was a Virginia district court case, Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc."' In declaring illegal a seniority merger plan similar to
that used by Crown Zellerbach, the court concluded ,"[t]he plain
language of the Act condemns as an unfair practice all racial discrim-
ination . . .that originated in seniority systems devisedbefore the
effective date of the Act."" This finding has been accepted by vir-
tually every court considering the question after Quarles.7
The next step to be taken by the courts was the formulation of
the precise standard used to determine whether a seniority system
which has the effect of freezing in past discrimination could still be
considered "bona fide" and therefore permissible. Quarles had sug-
gested that an "economic purpose" for the plan in the absence of
signs of discriminatory intent would suffice to sustain such a seniority
system. 6 However, this standard, closely analogous to the lenient
"business purpose" standard in testing cases, was soon replaced by
the test announced by the Fifth Circuit in Local 189, United Paper-
makers and Paperworkers v. United States. 9 In that case, Judge
Wisdom ruled that "business necessity" must be found to justify the
use of a seniority system having a discriminatory impact on blacks."
In attempting to justify the merger plan, the company had argued
that the plan was a business necessity because its implementation
would prevent the eruption of labor unrest and because the company
feared that some blacks would not be qualified to hold many of the
jobs in the formerly white line of progression." The court rejected the
first contention, ruling that danger of labor strife did not constitute
business necessity, and then made clear that the company need not
promote any black to a position for which he was not qualified.42 In
another case, Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight Co.,4 it was suggested
that only those seniority systems which are essential to the safe and
efficient operation of the business meet this standard.
35. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
36. 279 F. Supp. at 515.
37. United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Dobbins v. Local 212,
Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
38. Developments at 1161.
39. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 989.
41. Id. at 989-90.
42. It is worthy to note at this point the similarity between the "business necess-
ity" test and the "job related" standard of the testing cases.




In 1971, the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.44 issued its only declaration to date with regard to permis-
sible employment criteria under Title VII. Duke Power Co. operated
a hierarchically organized plant which, before Title VII became effec-
tive, restricted blacks to the lowest of five departments, labor. When
the operation of the Act mandated the end of overt discrimination, a
high school diploma or the passing of an intelligence test and a me-
chanical comprehension test became prerequisites for transfer from
the labor department to an "inside job" in one of the other depart-
ments.4" Thus, the Court was faced with a situation in which a non-
validated test was being used as a criterion for promotion from one
department, to which all blacks had been relegated by prior hiring
discrimination, to another department which was all-white and con-
tained the preferable jobs.
The Supreme Court reversed both the district court, which had
held the company not liable on the ground that Title VII did not
reach frozen-in discrimination, 4 as well as the court of appeals, which
used the rationale that Title VII applied only to intentional employer
discrimination.' The Court said, "[p]ractices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimi-
natory employment practices."49 Congress intended the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classification.
. . . The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.4
In outlawing the use of broad or general testing devices as well
as diplomas and degrees as fixed measures of capability, Chief Jus-
tice Burger emphasized that Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply their
motivation, and "placed on the employer the burden of showing that
44. 401 U.S. 421, 424 (1971).
45. Id. at 428.
46. Id. at 430.
47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1969).
48. 401 U.S. 421, 430 (1971).
49. Id. at 431.
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any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question."5" Moreover, the Court quite significantly en-
dorsed the EEOC guidelines as being in harmony with legislative
intent, remarking that "the administrative interpretation of the Act
by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference." '5'
In one sweeping stroke the Court (1) approved the Hicks ration-
ale that no discriminatory intent need be shown in order to constitute
a violation of Title VII; 5  (2) accepted the conclusion reached in Hicks
that once an employee has demonstrated the adverse differential
impact of an employment practice, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to demonstrate job relatedness; (3) adopted the Local 189
standard of "business necessity"53 and the "job relatedness" test of
Hicks; (4) affirmed Quarles' concept of Title VII reaching present
effects of past discrimination;" and (5) consolidated the standards to
be applied by courts in testing, seniority and promotion, or other
similar cases by grouping them into the category "employment prac-
tices." Thus, whenever an employment practice is shown to have an
adverse impact on blacks, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
that the practice is a business necessity, which, in the case of testing,
will presumably require a showing of job relatedness.
The questions left unanswered are: (1) the permissibility of pro-
motability testing; (2) the extent to which job relatedness must be
proved by empirical validation; (3) the necessity or propriety of dif-
ferential validation; and (4) the general issue of seniority systems.
Regarding the first three unanswered questions, the Court's strong
endorsement of the guidelines would seem to indicate a possibility of
future adoption of the Commission's liberal standards in these mat-
ters. However, it must be recognized that much of what was said in
the Griggs opinion was dicta. The particular fact situation dealt with
was the combination of (1) a non-job related test which (2) also oper-
ated to freeze in past discrimination, and it is at least theoretically
possible that a different result would be reached if only one of the
above elements were present.
Lower Court Response to Griggs: Employment Practices Standards
The courts of the Fifth Circuit have provided the dominant
forum for Title VII cases, and their interpretation of Griggs has been
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 433.
52. See text at note 12 supra.
53. See text at note 38 supra.
54. See text at note 34 supra.
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fairly representative of judicial response in other circuits. Griggs left
no doubt that proof that an employment practice has an adverse
impact on blacks as a group immediate ly establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination, forcing the employer to justify its use. The
first Fifth Circuit case after Griggs, and one which has given as ex-
pansive an interpretation of Title VII as any court of appeals case in
the country, was United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.'5 In that
portion of the decision involving testing procedures which had been
used in conjunction with other standards to determine promotions,
despite the government's failure to show that the test was preventing
blacks from being promoted, the fact that blacks scored poorly on the
test together with a showing that no blacks had been promoted since
the test was adopted, led the court to hold that "the inference that
test scores are important factors in the selection . . . becomes conclu-
sive.""
In another case, Hester v. Southern Railway Co.,57 a lower court
followed the lead of Jacksonville Terminal Co. by not requiring spe-
cific statistics regarding which part of the screening process, involv-
ing both a test and other procedures, was the deciding factor in dis-
qualifying the applicant. The court declared illegal an invalidated
intelligence test when statistics indicated that though only slightly
larger numbers of whites applied for the job, there were three times
more whites hired than blacks. 58
Thus, the decisions from the Fifth Circuit have generally ad-
hered to and even enlarged the Griggs position on use of statistics to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination in employment prac-
tices under Title VII.59 Generally, any showing of a substantial differ-
ence in black and white disqualification rates by use of a particular
criterion for making employment decisions will trigger an inquiry by
the court into the business necessity of the practice.
Although Griggs adopted the use of the business necessity stan-
dard as the showing required to justify a discriminatory employment
practice, it did not spell out exactly what that term meant. The
Supreme Court did say that the job relatedness quality of a test,
which enables it to predict which applicant is best able to perform
55. 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
56. Id. at 456.
57. 349 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
58. Id. at 812-16.
59. The courts of the Fifth Circuit have failed to award relief because the plaintiff
did not show differential impact in only two cases since Griggs. See Ochoa v. Mont-
santo Co., 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349
F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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in a particular position, justified the use of even a discriminatory test.
The apparent logic is that one, and perhaps the only business necess-
ity is that the employer hire applicants who can perform the work
required. But, are there other means and goals so essential to the
functioning of a business as to meet the business necessity standard?
Thus far, the Fifth Circuit has found none. Once again, Jacksonville
Terminal Co. set the tone with a bold declaration that "necessity
connotes an irresistible demand. To be preserved, the seniority and
transfer system must not only directly foster the safety and efficiency
of the plant, but must also be essential to those goals." 0 The court
further noted that crucial to the assertion that the existing seniority
system was a business necessity was proof that "[the] current occu-
pants of a class or craft are necessarily the only employees qualified
to fill vacancies in that craft or class."'2
In Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 2 the court of appeals, apply-
ing the "overriding, legitimate, non-racial business purpose" test as
equivalent to business necessity, ruled that a "no-transfer" rule
which served to freeze blacks into a lower department to which they
were relegated by pre-Act discrimination was not justified by the
three business purposes advanced by the employer: (1) additional
costs to the company; (2) labor problems which would be caused by
allowing transfers; and (3) the requirement of different skills for the
more desirable job. As to the third justification, the court made clear
that Roadway Express was not obliged to transfer a black employee
if he was not qualified for the job, but neither could the company
place an arbitrary barrier in the way of his transfer.
In another court of appeals case, United States v. Hayes Interna-
tional Corp., 3 a system involving "recall rights'" 4 based upon senior-
ity, which served to prejudice blacks who had been excluded from the
department before Title VII became effective was declared illegal. In
rejecting the claim of the corporation that this system was a business
necessity because it was "necessary" in times of rapid employee ex-
pansion to have experienced men in the higher positions, the court
said, "[w]hile this may be a non-racial business purpose, we do not
find it to be sufficiently overriding to outweigh the discriminatory
effect .... ,,15 Rowe v. General Motors Corp.16 is precisely in accord
60. United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971).
61. Id. (Emphasis added.)
62. 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972).
64. See text at note 31 supra.
65. 456 F.2d at 118.
66. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
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in an analogous situation of using "experience" as the criterion in
determining which employees would be laid off in a department
which was compulsorily all-white before 1962.67
It would seem that the business necessity test as applied by the
courts of the Fifth Circuit means this: an employment practice which
has a discriminatory impact cannot be justified under the doctrine
of business necessity unless it serves as an unequivocal predictor of
job performance for the positions from which it serves to bar a dispro-
portionate number of the protected group.6" As a practical matter,
this meaning of business necessity has resulted in the elimination of
any seniority or transfer system which serves to bar blacks from
higher positions or to disadvantage them from that attainment. This
is true even though the system operates in such a way that each job
successively trains the employee for the next job, because the courts
have recognized that there is no absolute certainty that none of the
employees involved is qualified to fill any higher position which he
may deserve on the basis of his seniority."
67. In Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala.
1972), a district court in Alabama upheld a rigidly validated test which had been
proven accurate in predicting success in an apprenticeship program for which it was
given to screen applicants.
68. Though not articulated concisely a decision by a federal district court in
California in Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
seems to agree with this analysis of business necessity: "The (Supreme) Court (in
Griggs) has stated that the only permissible reason for tolerating discrimination is
'business necessity' which is 'related to job performance.' The ability of the individual
effectively and efficiently to carry out his assigned duties is, therefore, the only justifi-
cation recognized by the law." Id. at 495.
69. Lest an improper conclusion be drawn, it is incumbent that the significance
of the business necessity test as what may seem to be a highly liberal interpretation
of the terms of Title VII be qualified somewhat. In applying this test to discriminatory
seniority systems, it is true that a mere assertion that each job serves to train employ-
ees for the next successively higher position cannot be used to justify a system using
employees' present status in the business structure as a criterion for promotion if such
status is predicated upon the employer's prior discrimination. Rather, the employer is
required to demonstrate that an employee is unqualified for the particular position to
which he is entitled according to his total plant seniority in order to deny him that
position when it becomes vacant. In practical terms, however, it must be noted that
the minority employee who has been relegated by prior discrimination to the lowest
rungs of employment in the company will usually not be qualified for the position
which he would presently occupy but for past discrimination, for the very reason that
each job trains its holder for the next position in the employment structure. It would
seem, therefore, that the fact that an employee is unqualified for his rightful position
should be considered as incident to the "frozen in" discrimination, the perpetuation
of which the Act has been interpreted to prohibit. Accordingly, employers should be
required to train their minority employees for the positions to which they are entitled,
in the same manner they would have been trained had they been allowed to progress
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While the adjustment of seniority systems presents few technical
or financial problems to employers themselves, the same is not true
in the case of meeting judicial testing standards. The strict empirical
validation of every employment test disqualifying a higher proportion
of blacks than whites, a standard equally required under the business
necessity rationale, sometimes poses real problems, and the actions
of the courts in this matter has reflected this situation.
As with the other areas considered, an analysis of the stringency
of the validation requirements imposed by the courts of the Fifth
Circuit must begin with the Jacksonville Terminal Co. case. There,
a test with discriminatory effects was struck down because the vali-
dation procedure did not meet the Griggs standard of a "demonstra-
ble relationship" between test results and job performance."' The test
had been developed "professionally" by railroad personnel,7' and'
"validation" was effected by correlating the test scores made by the
candidates for promotion with estimations given by their present
supervisors of the candidates' job potential in the positions they
sought. In holding the validation procedures deficient, the court en-
dorsed the validation standards of the EEOC guidelines and stated
Griggs demands more substantial proof, most often positive em-
pirical evidence, of the relationship between test scores and job
performance.
[T]est scores have been compared only with predicted, not
actual, job performance of blacks. The Terminal did not even
bother to use those persons holding Group I jobs (the positions
sought) at the time the test was devised as a control group, so
that a demonstrable correlation-or lack thereof-between test
scores and Group I job performance could have been ascer-
tained.72
Thus, the use of disciplined empirical validation was strongly en-
dorsed .73
unimpeded through established lines of progression. Courts have generally ignored
such a rationale, however, and this anomaly has deprived many of the seniority cases
of the practical impact they should have.
70. United States v. Jacksonville Term. Co., 451 F.2d 418, 455 (5th Cir. 1971).
71. Le., the chief baggage and mail agent and his chief clerk.
72. 451 F.2d at 456. The court, in effect, was emphasizing that the employer had
not even used concurrent validation procedures.
73. The lower courts have once again followed the dictates of Jacksonville Ter-
minal Co. in this area, as illustrated by Hester v. Southern Ry., 349 F. Supp. 812 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), which prohibited the use of a test which was not empirically validated. Two
other cases, Baker v. Columbus School District, 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972), and
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However, the latest case to be handed down on testing by the
court of appeals can only be described as an anomaly. In Allen v. City
of Mobile, 4 the court was confronted with a complaint by a black
police officer that a test given by the police department, the passing
of which was a requirement for promotion to sergeant, discriminated
against him in violation of his civil rights. 5 The case involved a long
history of overt racial discrimination with only a small proportion of
blacks on the police force as compared to their presence in the com-
munity."8 There had been only one black police sergeant in the city's
history. The lower court and the court of appeals thus found that the
test, which whites passed at a rate of sixty percent and blacks passed
at a rate of only fourteen percent, was discriminatory. Consequently,
the burden shifted to the city to prove that the test was job related
and the district court allowed the use of very lenient content validity
evidence to establish that showing.
The test was based entirely upon a "job description" prepared
in 1959 by an outside consulting agency having no part in formulating
the test itself, and there was strong evidence, upon which the district
court made no finding, questioning the accuracy of the description
even at the time it was formulated." The testing agency failed to
make any studies correlating job performance of present officers with
the test scores. In addition, the testimony supporting the validity of
the test was given by a representative of the company which itself
formulated the test.78
The court of appeals affirmed the finding79 and Judge Goldberg
issued a vigorous dissent, declaring that the district court and major-
ity had failed to apply the exacting requirements demanded by
Griggs to prove the relationship of a test to job performance. While
Umstead v. Starksville School District, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972), both of which
reached the court of appeals, also invoked Griggs in striking down a National Teacher
Examination, on which the school district required applicants to achieve a certain
arbitrary cut-off score in order to qualify for a teaching position.
74. 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. The employer involved was a city and Title VII did not cover governmental
employees at the time the suit was brought. However, the Griggs and Title VII stan-
dards on this matter have been held invariably to apply to cases brought under section
1983, and the entire case was heard and decided on this basis. See Baker v. Columbus
Mun. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972); Armstead v. Starksville Sch. Dist., 461
F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v.
Board of Exam., 458 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1972).
76. Of the police force of Mobile, 12.4 percent of the force is black while 33 percent
of the city is black. Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972).
77. Id. at 127.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 122.
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the district court had ruled that the test was "rationally related" to
the job to be performed, Goldberg maintained that Griggs required a
showing of a "manifest relationship" between the two." "To stop at
this low denominator (rational relationship) is to ignore both any sort
of purposive analysis of testing and the thrust of Griggs."'" Conclud-
ing that the analysis of content was "completely superficial and
wholly insufficient as a matter of law"' 2 to constitute even content
validity, Goldberg argued that the test should have been disallowed.
The dissent in this case is in harmony with the rest of the juris-
prudence. Perhaps the decision is explainable by the majority's view
of the economic realities of the situation. According to the district
court,
To require a small police department, suffering from inadequate
funding to expend probably more than $30,000 to conduct a test
study for examinations in an effort to mitigate the problems of
socially and culturally disadvantaged Negroes is not practical or
constitutionally required.8 3
One possible answer to this argument is that if courts are uniform in
their application of strict validation requirements, those private and
public employers who can afford the costs will pay them and those
who sincerely cannot will generate enough political pressure to force
Congress, as is only proper, to make available funds to conduct valid-
ity studies in order to enforce its own law affording equal employment
opportunity to all citizens.
One area that courts have hardly approached at all, even since
Griggs, is differential validation, probably because of the even greater
costs required by the process and perhaps also because of some mis-
understanding of the concept. Jacksonville Terminal Co. seems to
imply the necessity of something in the nature of differential valida-
tion when the court says, "[a]ccepting arguendo that whites scoring
high on the test perform satisfactorily in Group I positions, to con-
clude that therefore blacks scoring low could not adequately perform
the same jobs is a non sequitur." 84 Judge Goldberg also intimated the
necessity of such a procedure in his dissent in Allen.'" However, much
more typical of the attitude of judges toward differential validity was
80. Id. at 126.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 127-28.
83. Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
84. 451 F.2d at 455.
85. Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122, 127 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the declaration in Cooper v. Allen:8 "The law does not require lower
standards of employment for blacks. If the test is substantially re-
lated to the demands of the job and no black can pass the test, an
employer need not hire any blacks."
The apparent conclusion to be drawn from the validation cases
is that the strictness in the showing of job relatedness will probably
vary directly with the size and wealth of the employer, and that the
tendency will presumably be to require strict empirical validation
wherever feasible, with a special leniency afforded to underfinanced
governmental entities.
Since Griggs, the lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's
lead in avoiding the issue of promotability testing. 7 Either the issue
has not been presented or the courts have found it unnecessary to
consider it. It is not unlikely, however, to become a question for future
judicial consideration.
The Griggs business necessity-job relatedness standard has
been applied to many varying kinds of employment practices besides
testing procedures and seniority promotions. In the Fifth Circuit,
these include the subject interview," the policy of placing the burden
of lay-offs on the least senior employees, 9 recruitment practices,90
and a no-transfer rule.9 In addition, two interesting California dis-
trict court decisions bear notice.
In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.2 an employer was proscribed
from using arrest records as a criterion for denying employment to an
applicant. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America93 held that a manage-
ment policy of discharging employees who had their wages garnished
several times violated Title VII. The rationale in both cases was that,
evidence having been presented that blacks were arrested more often
and had their wages garnished more often, the employer had to prove
business necessity to justify continuing the use of those criteria. That
necessity was the relatedness to job performance, and neither em-
ployer being able to furnish such proof, the practices were outlawed.
Stephen G. Bullock
86. 467 F.2d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. 401 U.S. at 432.
88. Hester v. Southern Ry., 349 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
89. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. United States v. Hayes Int. Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972).
91. Bing v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971).
92. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
93. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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